Hostages of the Albigensian Crusade, part 1

As I read over the primary sources, several small topics arose which puzzled me.  One of these was the role of hostages.  Several examples appear in the Historia Albigensis and the Canso.  To the authors of these works, the taking of hostages seemed quite ordinary.  It did not appear to them to be notable enough to require any special explanation of the practice.  To the modern reader, however, the appearance of these hostages (and the frequent lack of any mention of their fates) presents a significant challenge in understanding the hostage exchanges described, what they meant to the participants, and what effect they may have had on subsequent events.

I had put the issue of hostages aside for some time when I came across a copy of Adam Kosto's "Hostages in the Middle Ages".  Kosto provides a comprehensive and intriguing analysis of the institution of hostageship throughout the medieval period and even, as it turned out, mentioned some instances of hostages in the Albigensian crusade about which I had not previously read. What follows is a brief discussion of the references to hostages which I have found, and some speculation as to the circumstances to which these references might refer.

Some Generalisations on Hostageship

Nowadays, when we think of hostages, we think of civilians suddenly abducted or held at gunpoint, subject to the threat of immediate death unless the demands of their captors are met.  In these instances, hostage-takers are almost always groups smaller and weaker than the adversaries of whom they make demands.  In the middle ages, however, hostages served a fairly different role.

Hostages, as Kosto puts it, served as guarantees of an agreement, and exchanges of hostages were a normal part of political, military and even financial agreements.  In a time when no higher authority could be expected to enforce agreements between parties, hostages were used as sureties.  When nobles parlayed, the weaker noble would often give a son into the keeping of the stronger, theoretically ensuring that he would stay true to the pledges he gave.  Hostages might be given to ensure that a truce was respected, that promised properties were handed over, or that debts were repaid.  Further, hostages were frequently offered as a show of good faith, rather than demanded under threat of force.  The institution of hostageship was so common that medieval chroniclers often did not note it in great detail, omitting to mention if or when hostages were eventually released.

The conditions under which hostages were kept varied immensely, but the danger of execution by the recipient of the hostage was not as great as might be expected.  Although the idea remained that the hostage guaranteed the agreement, it was quite rare that hostages would be killed when the agreement was violated.  Dead hostages were of no use in further negotiations and in the particular case of sons used as hostages, could form the basis of a feud which would continue long after the violation of the agreement had been resolved.  Furthermore, hostages treated well in the captor's entourage were often eventually useful as negotiators with the other side.  Hostages were indeed killed, from time to time, sometimes for violations of the agreement and sometimes for other reasons, but these appear to have been unusual occurrences.

The first example of hostageship in the Albigensian Crusade which I will examine here does not appear to have been unusual for its time, but it highlights the difficulties historians have in approaching the strange practice of hostage exchange.

Raymond-Roger of Foix's son

William of Tudela wrote in the Canso (Laisse 41, pp. 29-30) about the situation immediately after the fall of Carcassonne in August, 1209:

 When the crusaders had gone back to their own lands, the count de Montfort was left in great difficulty and almost without companions after their departure.  He now reached a settlement with the count of Foix, who voluntarily gave him his youngest son as a hostage.  This agreement did not last long, for they soon broke all its terms and then made vigorous war on each other.

This is the first mention of Raymond-Roger, the count of Foix, in the Canso although the crucial role he was to play later as a military opponent of the crusade indicates what an important agreement this must have been for Simon de Montfort.  Some clues as to what the agreement may have been are provided by Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay in his Historia Albigensis (V, § 120, p.66):

Returning from Limoux, the Count went to a fortress named Preixan, which was near Carcassonne and belonged to the Count of Foix, and laid siege to it.  Whilst the siege was still going on the Count of Foix came to the Count and swore to stand by the orders of the Church in all things and gave his son to the Count as a hostage; in addition he handed over the castrum under siege.  After this, the Count returned to Carcassonne.

Peter records the subsequent failure of this agreement in (V, § 134, p.73), after recounting the rebellion of Castres and Lombers against de Montfort:

At this time the Count of Foix who had as previously narrated made a pact of friendship with our Count, in an act of treachery took over the castrum of Preixan which he had previously handed over to him.  He abandoned his alliance with our Count and began to attack him vigorously.  A little later, on the feast of St Michael, this traitor came by night to the castrum called Fanjeaux and arranged for ladders to be erected against the walls.

The negotation which had occurred between de Montfort and the count of Foix was referred to as a "settlement" and "agreement" by William of Tudela and as a "pact of friendship" and "alliance" by Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay.  Both authors mention the giving of the count's son as a hostage.  William notes that this was done "voluntarily" by his father.  As noted above, a hostage might be offered or given, not under threat, but as a show of good faith.  Certainly, it does not appear that by this point the Count of Foix was in dire straits in his conflict with the crusade.

The Identity of the Hostage

The identity of this hostage, the "youngest son" of the count of Foix, has generally been thought to be Aimery. This is the conclusion of Janet Shirley, translator of the Canso.  Laisse 41 of the Canso, quoted above, states that "the youngest son" of the count of Foix was the hostage and Shirley, in a footnote to this laisse notes that "his youngest son's name was Aimery".

The make-up of Raymond-Roger's family is not detailed by our chroniclers, but the identification of the hostage with Raymond-Roger's son Aimery seems to have been made in 1640 by the bishop and historian Pierre de Marca in his book "Histoire de Béarn", in which he recounted the history of the Albigensian crusade and of the counts of Foix.  Pierre de Marca included in his book several charters and other documents which he had found relating to his subject, many of them either paraphrased by him or translated by him into French.

 In Chapter XX, Section VII of the Histoire de Béarn, Pierre de Marca paraphrases the last will and testament of Raymond-Roger of Foix, written in 1222.  In it, he leaves the county of Foix to his son Roger-Bernard, and his holdings in the dioceses of Narbonne and Carcassonne to his son Aimeri.  Some arrangements are also made for his daughter Cécile.  No other children are mentioned in this document, although the document is not reproduced in the Histoire, but merely described.

It appears to be on the basis of this testament, written 13 years after the hostage transaction of 1209, that Pierre de Marca concluded that the hostage must have been Aimeri.  Pierre de Marca presented this conclusion earlier, in Chapter XV, Section V:

(my rough translation:  "This son whom the count Raymond-Roger gave as a hostage, was the youngest of his children, according to the Chronicle manuscript of count Raymond: this son was named Amauri, in the testament of his father")

This shows two things.  First, that Pierre de Marca based his conclusion on the testament previously mentioned, and second that he did not devote any considerable rigor to this identification, incorrectly recalling the son's name as "Amauri" rather than as "Aimeri".  The two were not different spellings of the same name, but rather different names altogether, although their similarity explains Pierre de Marca's error.

Now, Raymond-Roger of Foix had other children than the three mentioned in his testament.  Loup, or "Wolf" appears in the Canso, but is thought by Shirley, the translator, to be illegitimate because he does not also appear in the paraphrase of his father's testament.

Interestingly, Pierre de Marca's book also includes another document, this one dating from 1229, when Roger-Bernard, now having succeeded his father as count of Foix, made his submission to the French crown and the Church.  In Chapter XXI, Section X, Pierre de Marca translates Roger-Bernard's document, in which he mentions his brothers:

Here, three brothers are mentioned: Aimeri, Loup and Athon Arnaud.  Even in genealogies of the counts of Foix which mention Loup, such as in Elaine Graham-Leigh's "The Southern French Nobility and the Albigensian Crusade", Athon Arnaud does not appear.  This exclusion may be because he does not appear in other texts.  However, his appearance here highlights how little we know about the children of Raymond-Roger of Foix.

It may be that Loup and Athon Arnaud do not appear in the testament because they were illegitimate sons.  It may also be that they did not inherit in that testament in order that the holdings of the house of Foix were not split up and distributed too widely.  Regardless, it appears to be an unwarranted assumption that the only other son mentioned in the testament of 1222 must have been the "youngest son" given in 1209.

Neither William of Tudela nor Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay mentions what happened to the hostage as a result of the continuation of hostilities.  He does not appear again in either text.  If it was, in fact, Aimeri then he would appear to have survived his ordeal.  But that is by no means proven.  If Raymond-Roger had another son whom he gave as a hostage and that son did not survive to 1222, or did not inherit in Raymond-Roger's testament, we would not know from the sources we have.

The above is based on the assumption that we have no better sources on the count of Foix's family than what Pierre de Marca was working on.  So far, I have not found any, although I have made inquiries and stand to be corrected should any turn up.  If so, I will certainly add to this post.

The Duration of the Peace

Although the giving and taking of hostages was a frequent occurrence to guarantee agreements, it often appears to have been unsuccessful, as it was in this case.  Whatever the details of the agreement between Raymond-Roger of Foix and Simon de Montfort, the deal was broken very quickly and they found themselves at war soon after the count of Foix's young son was handed over to de Montfort.  Typically, Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay places all blame for the breakdown of the agreement on the treachery of the Count of Foix, but it is interesting to note that William of Tudela noted that "they" (i.e. both Simon de Montfort and Raymond-Roger of Foix) broke the agreement and attacked each other.  


Peter gives us no indication of the date of this agreement, so some educated guesswork must be employed.  The only firm date which we have around this time is for the crusade's arrival at Carcassonne, which is mentioned in the legates' letter to the Pope as being on the feast day of St Peter in Chains, August 1st.  The translators of our primary sources suggest that Carcassonne surrendered on August 15th, but this appears to be an estimation based on the length of the siege and of negotiations.  Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay reported that Simon de Montfort was then elected leader of the crusade, stayed a few days at Carcassonne,  then went to Fanjeaux, then Castres, then returned to the neighbourhood of Carcassonne, then back to Fanjeaux, then to Mirepoix, then to Pamiers, then back to Fanjeaux again, then on to Lombers, then to Albi, then Limoux, before beginning the siege of Preixan.  Our estimate of the date of the agreement is important as it will give us some indication of how long it lasted, but clearly a great deal of time must have passed since mid-August.

The agreement failed when the count of Foix retook Preixan and Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay reported that "a little later", he attacked Fanjeaux on the Feast of St Michael.  That falls on September 29 and is the only other firm date presented for this period.  It is likely that Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay has made an error here.  After his agreement with the Count of Foix, Peter related that Simon met King Pedro II of Aragon in Montpellier and "stayed for fifteen days".  Following that unsuccessful diplomatic effort, Simon attempted to relieve some of his knights who were besieged, but could not cross the flooded river Aude and returned to Carcassonne, where another hostage, the young Viscount Raymond-Roger Trencavel, had just died in prison.  He then heard that Giraud de Pepieux had turned against him and rode out to Puisserguier to face him.  He then razed "numerous castra and after a few days returned to Carcassonne".

Although many dates here are not given, clearly far too much has happened in order to be fit between the siege of Carcassonne on August 1st and the Count of Foix's attack on Fanjeaux on September 29th.  A clue as to how to correct Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay's mistakes is the death of the young Viscount, which the necrology of Carcassonne gives as November 10th.  The Siblys, in their translation of the Historia note this discrepancy and devote their Appendix E to an attempt to resolve it.  Their conclusion seems to be, quite reasonably, that Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay was incorrect about the Feast of St Michael and that the Count of Foix retook Preixan and Fanjeaux sometime in November or December of 1209.  They note that some historians, including Roquebert, disagree and accept Peter's date for Fanjeaux, attempting to re-order Simon's other activities in order to fit a reasonable timeline.

Whichever of these hypotheses we are to accept, we are left with an agreement which lasted a very short time -- either a matter of days or two to three months.  It is possible that Raymond-Roger's son was given as a hostage only very temporarily, perhaps to ensure the smooth handing over of Preixan, and returned to his father immediately after.  This does not fit well, however, with Peter des Vaux-de-Cernay's description.  Peter is the only one who suggests some of the terms of the agreement -- that the count of Foix would stand by the orders of the church in all things -- and states that Raymond-Roger gave his son as hostage to guarantee this agreement.  He then states that "in addition" the castle of Preixan was to be handed over.  This would seem to imply that the agreement was indefinite and the quick return of the hostage was not anticipated.  In that case, Raymond-Roger of Foix would have retaken Preixan knowing that Simon de Montfort continued to hold his son at his mercy and was either willing to sacrifice his son to his other goals or was confident that de Montfort would not kill him.  If that was the gamble he took, it may not have been a desperate one.  Simon de Montfort would have gained little from being known as a cold-blooded executioner of a noble youth given to him voluntarily and may have been successful at using the hostage in some future negotiations over the following 9 years.  History does not relate.

Conclusion

As is typical of medieval accounts of hostageship, this one raises more questions than it answers.  Aside from the doubt about the identity of the hostage, it is strange indeed that the peace agreement broke down as quickly as it did.  Presumably, this did not lead to the execution of the hostage as that would likely have been notable enough to be recorded by one of our sources.  Why the hostage was given, and whether it had any effect on relations between Simon de Montfort and Raymond-Roger of Foix remains open to speculation.  Clearly, any consideration of risk to the hostage did not long delay the commencement of hostilities. 

In my next post, I will examine a quite different hostage-taking: the rounding up of the citizens of Toulouse.